ABSTRACT Notwithstanding elite opposition to referendums as inconsistent with theories of representative democracy, the 27-nation European Election Study finds that 63 percent of EU citizens want a vote on EU treaties. One explanation is that the majority want more popular participation in politics; another is that referendums are demanded by those negative about the performance of their governors at national and EU levels; a third is that demand is higher where referendums are part of the national context. Multi-level statistical analysis shows greater support for the hypotheses that citizens dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to want referendums to check their governors and that national context matters. However, dissatisfied EU citizens are a minority; most who endorse EU referendums are actually pro-EU. This lowers the risk of defeat if the EU consulted its citizens in a pan-European referendum.
Introduction
The popular election of representatives is a necessary condition of a political system being democratically accountable. Periodic elections are deemed sufficient to hold representatives accountable (see Qvortrup, 2005) and many contributions to this symposium regard increasing the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs as the appropriate means of strengthening democracy within the EU. Within the European Union, less than half of its members require national referendums (C2D, 2011; Altman, 2011) . There is no reference to referendums in the index of Dahl's (1989) overview of democracy. The American Constitution makes no provision for federal referendums and less than half of American states do so (see Stanley and Niemi, 2008: 313) . Switzerland is egregious in the use of referendums (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2007) .
A referendum is a vote on a specific issue of public policy, whereas parliamentary elections offer a broad brush choice. Voters endorse the party or representatives with a package of policies closest to their priorities, even though some may be inconsistent with their preferences. Alt and Alesina (1996: 659) note, 'There will always be agency losses'. By contrast, in a referendum voters decide the outcome, even though governors decide the text on the ballot.
1 Unlike deliberative democracy forums, which may not produce a clear cut outcome that is politically binding on government, a referendum can do so (Goodin, 2008) . The result is:
'Referendums disarm party elites' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 20) . A referendum is democratic if there is the possibility that the electorate may reject the government's position; if not, the ballot is a plebiscite (Uleri, 2000) . If a referendum result supports government policy, it may appear redundant, but this is not the case. It demonstrates majority commitment to a decision by representatives and losers as well as winners are expected to accept the outcome (cf. Anderson et al., 2005; Esaiasson, 2010) . If a proposal is rejected, this supports the case for giving citizens a referendum veto because governors cannot be trusted to represent their views (Bowler et al., 2007) .
The use of referendums in the European Union is contested (cf. Setälä, 2009; Maduz, 2010) . The opposition is strongest from those who see themselves as trustees of the collective interest of all Europeans and those committed to the founders goal of an ever closer Union. Jean Monnet (1978: 367) , thought it 'wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a Community of which they had no practical experience'. The current President of the European Commission, José
Manuel Barroso, argues that to have important EU issues decided by a vote of uninformed and uninterested electors would 'undermine the Europe we are trying to build by simplifying important and complex subjects' (Hobolt, 2009: 23) . Most critics of the democratic deficit contributing papers to this symposium call for more representative democracy, (e.g. Bellamy, Cooper, Lord and Pollak). Proponents of participatory democracy justify referendums as increasing the opportunity for citizens to be involved in making political decisions (Pateman, 1970 (Pateman, , 2012 Hobolt, 2009: 242ff 
The Supply and Demand for European Union Referendums
The Maastricht Treaty's statement in Article 10.1 that 'the Union shall be founded on representative democracy' makes the EU distinctive among intergovernmental organizations in having a popularly elected parliament with significant institutional powers. It also supports the view that elected representatives do not require having their decisions checked by referendums. Because EU decisions are made in multinational institutions, there is much more potential for agency loss between national electorates and decision makers than in national politics (Rose and Borz, 2013) .
The principle set out in Article 10.3 of the Treaty of the European Union-'decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen'-is interpreted as being met by the European Parliament. A proposal for the Constitution for Europe to be ratified by a pan-European referendum was explicitly rejected by the non-elected Constitutional Convention (Castiglione et al., 2007 Whether a referendum is held can reflect a variety of rationales. A national government can invoke the logic of appropriateness to justify asking citizens to give their consent to a measure of constitutional importance (Closa, 2007 (Closa, : 1316 (Closa, , 1321 March and Olsen, 2006) . A decision to call an EU referendum can be a tactical tool of a government seeking partisan advantage against the opposition or a means of escaping from partisan divisions within itself (Dür and Mateo, 2011: Setälä and Schiller, 2009; Altman, 2011 Whatever the outcome, the selectivity of national referendums on EU issues creates gross inequalities between EU citizens, because a big majority is not allowed to vote on a treaty since their national government does not call a referendum This substantial majority is consistent with national surveys asking citizens about referendums on national political issues (Bowler et al., 2007: 352) .
Support for referendums extends across the whole of Europe: the chief difference between countries is in the size of the national majority. In Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom, more than 80 percent endorsed a referendum and in 25 of 27 member states an absolute majority of respondents was in favour. The size of the majority endorsing a referendum is more likely to be reduced by an above-average percentage of don't knows than by large-scale opposition. In Sweden and Slovenia, where endorsement is lowest, there are nonetheless pluralities of 45 and 41 percent in favour of referendums.
Since a survey question is hypothetical, replies may exaggerate demand.
Turnout at actual European referendums provides an indication of the extent to which action matches words (see LeDuc, 2003: 170f) . In 20 referendums in countries that were already members of the European Union when a ballot was held, turnout has averaged 66.1 percent. Consistent with theories that turnout should be higher at first-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) , in the immediately preceding national election turnout was 10 percentage points higher on average. However, by comparison with the national turnout at the immediately preceding European Parliament election, average turnout at an EU referendum was more than 12
percentage points higher.
Theories of Why Citizens Want Referendums
Normative theories justifying or rejecting referendums have empirical implications.
Theories that make popular participation a major desideratum of democracy imply that individuals who participate in politics or have the resources to do so will be more likely to favour referendums. An alternative theory is that referendum demand comes Political participation is the result of a socialization process in which individuals acquire socio-economic resources and predispositions to political engagement. Empirical research consistently finds that people with more socioeconomic resources, such as education, income and social status, are more likely to participate in politics (Nevitte et al., 2009 ). Inglehart (1990) has theorized that the EU's complex and remote character requires even more education for individuals to participate. Since older people have had more time to become familiar with politics, age should also encourage more support for referendums (see e.g. Plutzer, 2002) .
A disposition to endorse political participation, including referendums, can also be driven by interest in politics. Brady et al. (1995: 283) emphasize the importance of interest in politics independent of socio-economic resources. However, Almond and Verba (1963: 77ff, 180ff ) caution that many people high in resources do not bother to participate because politicians are trusted to act as agents responsive to the wishes of better educated and economically better off citizens (cf. Lijphart, 1997 were neither engaged nor enraged (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 41) . However, the eurozone crisis has made the impact of EU policies very visible, distributing costs as well as benefits.
Referendums offer citizens dissatisfied with government performance an effective means of rejecting decisions taken by governors whom they do not see as representing their views. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 227) argue that citizens who do not want to be engaged in conventional politics 'feel that they need to be involved, even though they would rather not be' in order to check unsatisfactory governors. Moreover, they theorize that individuals low in socio-economic resources favour referendums as giving them the opportunity to veto decisions made by policymakers representing more resourceful electors.
In the multi-level European political system, the performance of government can be evaluated at both the national and the European levels. Reif and Schmitt's (1980; Hix and Marsh, 2011) model of public opinion stresses that national politics is of first-order importance, because it provides shortcuts for understanding remote second-order issues arising at the EU level. Individuals dissatisfied with the performance of their national government or national economic situation can project their feelings onto EU institutions (cf. Duch and Stevenson, 2008: 157ff) . However, a referendum on an EU issue increases the potential second-order effect of EU performance (Glencross and Trechsel, 2011) . The more confidence individuals have in how the EU performs, the less they should feel the need for referendums, while citizens against European integration should endorse referendums as offering a means of stopping moves toward an ever closer Union. Bulgaria and Romania were as low as 3.8 and Italy and Greece were almost as low (www.transparency.org).
H 3 CONTEXT. The more national context favours referendums, the more likely individuals are to favour EU referendums.

Testing Hypotheses about the Demand for Referendums
In forming their political opinions, individuals are subject to stimuli evaluated according to the prior political dispositions and cognitive capacities (Zaller, 1992: 42ff). Because we want to take both individual and contextual influences into account, multi-level modelling (MLM) is an appropriate statistic. Given the ordinal distribution of our dependent variable, the STATA gllamm function is used to estimate an ordered logit model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Gelman and Hill, 2007) . Since the EES sample has 27,069 respondents, we focus on variables with a significance level of better than .00. Details of the distribution and coding of independent variables are given in the Appendix table.
Participatory Influences Not as Expected
Although characteristics that encourage individuals to participate in national politics significantly affect the demand for EU referendums, the direction of influence resources-education, standard of living, age or gender--has a significant direct effect on attitudes toward a referendum (Table 1) . People more interested in politics are more in favour of referendums and this is also the case of those socialized to identify with a party (Table 1) . However, the interaction of education and political interest has a significant negative effect. , 1995; Nevitte et al., 2009 ). This may be due to referendums being about issues rather than party or candidate-focussed.
Dissatisfaction with performance drives demand
In Europe's multi-level political system citizens have a choice of governments to be satisfied or dissatisfied with. National governments can be held to account for their performance at the European level and vice versa. As predicted in hypothesis 2, government performance at both levels has a significant effect on referendum demand. The more dissatisfied people are with their national government, the readier they are to endorse referendums that enable them to challenge treaties approved by governors that lack their confidence. In a complementary manner, individuals who voted for the governing party are more likely to accept decisions at the EU level without a referendum. Even though the EES survey was conducted after the 2008 economic crisis had erupted, the state of the national economy had no significant direct effect on referendum demand. Since an individual's standard of living also lacks a significant effect, this gives strong support to the view that attitudes toward EU referendums do not reflect economic performance but satisfaction or dissatisfaction with political performance.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that citizens dissatisfied with the EU ought to be readier to express their rage by rejecting EU treaties at referendums, and this receives statistical support. People who lack confidence in the EU's governors taking decisions in the interests of their country are significantly more likely to favour referendums. Likewise, the more people are dissatisfied with the existing level of democracy in the EU, the readier they are to endorse referendums. Since an EU treaty advances European integration, those more opposed to an ever closer Union are readier to want the check of a referendum.
Context matters too
After controlling for the effect of differences found within every country, differences in national context also have an effect on referendum demand (Table 1) Given the very large sample size, there is support for all three of our hypotheses; however, the degree of support is not equal. A likelihood ratio test of the influence of different sets of indicators 3 finds that the highest chi2 (df) value is given to hypothesis 2, especially from measures of EU performance and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the national government. The very strong influence of EU performance suggests that first-order national influences on EU attitudes have declined since their importance was emphasized more than three decades ago by Reif and Schmitt (1980) , at least as far as issue-oriented referendums are concerned. Moreover, the eurozone crisis has increased the national salience of EU performance, creating the possibility of the 'sleeping giant' of EU issues being roused in electing the European Parliament or national parliaments (Eijk and Franklin, 2007) . The likelihood ratio tests also show some support for socio-economic resources and political engagement affecting the demand for referendums. However, this does not always occur as predicted by theories of participation, since pro-referendum citizens affected by rage at the performance of government tend to be lower in their capacity for participation. There is least support for the influence of context; within every member state attitudes toward referendums tend to be divided, with the foregoing influences accounting for within-nation differences of opinion.
Consistent with referendums offering a check on governors, referendum demand is stronger among enraged than engaged citizens (cf. Bowler et al., 2007) .
People who do not identify with Europe, have low confidence in EU decisions, and see it as having a democratic deficit are more likely to favour referendums that can check further advances toward an ever closer Union. While this appears to support the Brussels fear of involving unsympathetic European citizens in decisions about the future of the EU, the fear is exaggerated, because those unsympathetic with the EU are a minority of European citizens. A majority in favour of more integration also endorse referendums. Altogether, 39 percent of those favouring a referendum endorse increased integration, 33 percent are against further integration, and 28 percent are undecided. If a referendum is held, the median voter is likely to be undecided about whether an ever closer Union is in principle desirable or undesirable, and open to evaluating the specifics of the issues at stake in a given ballot.
Dynamic Implications
Whatever public opinion surveys say, EU policymakers would like to continue relying on the existing system of representation without the risk of the future rejection of a treaty arrived at after painstaking negotiations among governments representing member states. Since the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have legal obligations to hold a referendum before ratifying any new treaty, to sustain this position would require confining the EU's activities within the limits of powers conferred by existing treaties. The new economic powers approved to deal with the eurozone crisis have an ambiguous status: they are set out in a document described as a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. 4 Its section 16 declares that 'within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty' necessary steps will be taken to 'incorporate the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union'. A referendum in one or more countries appears unavoidable in the medium term; doing so under existing practices would raise issues about equality among EU citizens.
Unanimity and Inequality in a Multi-National EU
In a national referendum every citizen has the right to vote. However, in the EU today the few percent living in countries have a vote on multi-national EU treaties and the unanimity requirement means that this small minority determines the outcome for up to 99 percent with no vote. A unanimity rule is not required to amend a national constitution. The norm is to require some kind of super or concurring majority of legislative chambers, federal partners or citizens.
It would be possible to finesse the unanimity requirement by making provision for enhanced cooperation, an existing EU procedure in which a substantial number of member states agree to cooperate for stated ends, but those that do not wish to do so opt out (Piris, 2012) . Thus, if an EU measure was rejected in one or more national referendums, a national majority would be respected by the country being allowed to opt out of its provisions, while enhanced cooperation would proceed among countries where a majority approved (Koelliker, 2006) .
The dynamic consequences of enhanced co-operation for European integration depend on whether divisions are temporary or permanent (Rose, 2013: chapter 9). The EU's official glossary mistakenly describes the variable geometry that initially results from enhanced co-operation as creating 'irreconcilable' differences separating member states (www.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary). However, divisions are temporary if there are leaders and laggards. Should the initiative of leaders in enhanced cooperation appear successful, laggards can catch up and adopt an enhance policy to.
What originally appeared as a two-speed Europe then becomes a Union in which all member states have sooner or later moved together. The conversion of EFTA members into EU members is an example of catching up, while the eurozone crisis has re-enforced the division of Europe into multiple currency zones.
Promoting Equality
Current practice within the EU creates gross inequalities between those of its citizens allowed to vote on treaties and those that are not. Since the EU lacks the power to prevent a national government from calling a referendum, the only way to
give every European citizen the right to vote would be to hold a pan-European referendum on each new treaty. Consistent with the EU's use of super-majorities and rules for amending national constitutions, a positive EU outcome could require a concurring majority of the electorate and of member states. This principle is often found in federal systems (Rose, 2012) and is consistent with the logical of individuals being both national and European citizens. 
Notes
1. An Initiative is different from a referendum because the decision to call a vote and the text of the question is determined by whoever organizes the initiative (see Setälä and Schiller, 2012) . 2. In addition, Norway has held two referendums in which voters rejected EU membership and Switzerland six about association with the EU. 3. Details available from the authors. 4. A cognate word for treaty is used in other official languages except German, which describes the document ambiguously as a vertrag (treaty or contract) or evasively as a pakt. 
